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ABSTRACT In cognitive radio networks, cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is generally adopted for
improving spectrum sensing accuracy to increase spectrum utilization and avoid interference with the
primary users. However, somemalicious secondary users (SUs) may affect the CSS performance by inducing
false observation bits for fusion. The message authentication code (MAC) is a promising technique to avoid
the damage from the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks. In this paper, as both the more
spectrum sensing nodes and the MAC reporting bits result in extra energy consumption, we propose an
energy efficiency model to capture the effects of the length of MAC and the number of cooperative SUs
under independent and collaborative SSDF attacks, respectively, and analyze the existence of the optimal
length of MAC and the optimal number of cooperative SUs that can achieve the maximum value of energy
efficiency, respectively. Simulation results are provided to show that the CSS scheme based on MAC can
resist SSDF attacks and the accuracy of the theoretical analysis is also validated.
INDEX TERMS Cooperative spectrum sensing, spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack, message
authentication code, energy efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
To further improve the spectrum utilization and meet the
individual communications services, cognitive radio has
emerged as an intelligent technology in the future wire-
less communication system [1]–[5]. In the cognitive radio
networks (CRNs), the vacant licensed spectrum of primary
users (PUs) can be utilized by secondary users (SUs) through
the spectrum sensing (SS). Many methods have been used
to improve the performance, for example, Li et al. pro-
posed an effective antenna selection algorithm to signifi-
cantly improve the performance of interference alignment
based CRNs in [3]. Relative to individual spectrum sens-
ing, cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), which is gener-
ally applied in CRNs, can improve the spectrum sensing
accuracy even more [6]. Whereas adversaries can compro-
mise some sensor nodes to send false sensing consequences
on the basis of the wireless broadcast nature, where spectrum
sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks significantly create
CRNs vulnerability [7], [8]. In SSDF attacks, in order to
reduce spectrum utilization and degrade overall network
performance, compromised nodes may mislead the channel
availability decision by operating independently or coop-
eratively [9]. So as to avoid the damage from SSDF
attack, researchers have proposed many countermeasures
in CRNs including radio propagation characteristics [10],
incentive-based mechanisms [11], trust/reputation based
approaches [12], consensus-based approaches [13], [14],
hidden Markov models (HMMs)-based malicious user
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detection approaches [15], a modified combinatorial
optimization identification (COI) [16], data cleansing
approaches [17] and clustering based methods [18], [19].
However, few related papers consider symmetric crypto-
graphic mechanism, which can produce a message authen-
tication code (MAC) to verify the spectrum sensing data
reports [20], [21], because MAC is a low-overhead secure
CSS protocol.
Recently, people have paid more attention to energy-
efficiency, which is defined as the ratio of the rate to the total
power consumption. Energy efficiency is important to CRNs
since it is a precedent condition to attain high utilization
of the batteries. Cooperative spectrum sensing can improve
the spectrum sensing accuracy, but the energy consumption
of SUs would linearly increase with the number of sensor
nodes which participate in spectrum sensing [22]. In general,
when all sensor nodes participate in spectrum sensing, it can
maximize the spectral efficiency but may not maximize the
energy efficiency. Hence, there have been some literature
studying the energy efficient maximization and secure prob-
lem for SSDF in CRNs [20]–[24]. A cooperative spectrum
sensing schemewas proposed to obstruct SSDF attacks in two
attack cases (i.e., independent and cooperative SSDF attacks),
and increase the energy efficiency in CRNs [23]. The conse-
quent gain in energy-efficiency is analyzed and evaluated for
the CRNs with a frame structure accommodating CSS and
cooperation in primary PU’s transmission or opportunistic
SUs’ transmission while maintaining the same SS reliability
and target PU’s transmission rate [24]. On the other hand,
the fusion center (FC), which is responsible for obtaining and
processing the local decisions and then making the final deci-
sion, needs the information reported by MAC, so using MAC
requires extra energy consumption to provide some additional
bits. It is for this reason that the number of the additional secu-
rity bits should be optimized to achieve the maximum energy
efficiency [20]. In [21], the objective of energy efficiency
maximization was studied with the constraints of CSS report
distance, message bit length and report error rate. In addition,
the optimal value of message bits was decided only in the
K -out-of-N fusion rule with K = 1. Therefore, it is critical
to study the maximum energy efficiency through jointly opti-
mizing the number of sensor nodes and the number of the
additional security bits. In this paper, a MAC based energy
efficient cooperative spectrum sensing scheme is proposed to
obstruct SSDF attacks and enhance the energy efficiency in
CRNs. On the whole, the main contributions of this paper are
three aspects.
• We discuss the CSS problems under independent and
collaborative SSDF attacks, respectively, and adopt a
low-overhead symmetric cryptographic mechanism that
reduces the effects of the malicious users on energy
efficiency.
• The energy efficiency optimization problem is formu-
lated, where the design variables are the number of coop-
erative sensor nodes and the number of the additional
security bits as design variables. The relations between
energy efficiency and two variables is theoretically ana-
lyzed under two types of SSDF attacks, respectively.
• Extensive simulation results on the energy efficiency
performance along with performance comparison are
reported in the different cases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: proposed
system model is presented in Section II. Section III analyzes
the optimization problem and its solution. Numerical results
are then provided in Section IV, and the paper is concluded in
Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a CRN with a PU and N SUs, as shown in Figure 1.
The cognitive users opportunistically utilize the channels
whenever they are idle and perform cooperative spectrum
sensing to figure out the presence or absence of primary users
over different time slots. A data fusion center gathers the
individual binary decisions by the cognitive nodes to make
the final decision on spectrum sensing results.
FIGURE 1. CR networks system model in the presence SSDF attack.
A. CSS AND DECISION RULE
Each sensor performs local spectrum sensing independently.
The communications between PU transmitter and receiver
are carried out with the probability 1 − P0, where P0 is the
probability of the channel being idle. To avoid the act of
collidingwith PU, each SU carries out cyclic energy detection
in the target bands. The detection can be transformed into a
binary hypothesis problem, in which H0 indicates that the
channel is idle and H1 indicates that the channel is busy.
An energy detector is utilized to integrate the received signal
in bandwidth fs/2 over the sensing period τ . The sensor i
will decide whether the channel is occupied by PUs or not
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through comparing the collected energy Ei with a predefined
threshold εi. The decision is given by
Di =
{
1 Ei > εi
0 otherwise
(1)
The false alarm probability Pf and detection probability Pd
of the sensor are defined as
Pf = Pr {Di = 1|H0} = Pr {Ei > εi|H0} (2)
Pd = Pr {Di = 1|H1} = Pr {Ei > εi|H1} (3)






ε − fsτ − γ√
2fsτ + 4γ
) (5)
where γ = σ 2x /σ 2n is the received signal-to-noise ratio.
The cooperative spectrum sensing performed by multiple
sensors can solve the hidden terminal problem as a result of
shadowing or multipath fading. Each sensor independently
carries out spectrum sensing and comes to a decision. They
transmit the decisions to the base station. The base sta-
tion fuses these decisions to reach the final decision based
on some fusion rules, where there are ‘OR’, ‘AND’ and
























And the ‘K /N ’ rule can be expressed as














If M (M < K < N ) malicious users exist and they are of












where Di is the report of SUi given by (1), ωj is the report
of MUj.
B. ATTACK MODEL
In SSDF attacks, the false spectrum sensing results can be
independently or collaboratively sent by the compromised
nodes to misdirect the global decision of cooperative spec-
trum sensing. Two types of SSDF attacks are introduced as
follows.
1) INDEPENDENT SSDF ATTACK
Independent SSDF (I-SSDF) attack means to that each node
compromised by adversary independently reports its sensing
consequence with specific probabilities.
Case 1: Always free Malicious Attack
Allmalicious users send the ‘0’ to data fusion center. In this
case, the detection probability and false alarm probability by
the K/(N −M) rule are written as follows, respectively,








j(1− Pd )N−M−j, (13)








j(1− Pf )N−M−j. (14)
Case 2: Always busy Malicious Attack
Allmalicious users send the ‘1’ to data fusion center. In this
case, the detection probability and false alarm probability
by the (K −M)/(N −M) rule can be written as follows,
respectively,








j(1− Pd )N−M−j, (15)








j(1− Pf )N−M−j. (16)
Case 3: Always wrong Malicious Attack
Each malicious user always sends the opposite of the
original sensing result to data fusion center. In this case,
the detection probability and false alarm probability can be
obtained as follows, respectively,








j(1− Pd )N−M−j (17)








j(1− Pf )N−M−j. (18)
2) COLLABORATIVE SSDF ATTACK
In collaborative SSDF (C-SSDF) attack, those nodes com-
promised the adversaries, which are selected for spectrum
sensing, can collaboratively send false sensing consequences
to misdirect the global decision. In particular, they can first
interflow their sensing results with each other and collab-
oratively come to a consistent decision about the licensed
channel availability by the L/M rule. Then, the nodes compro-
mised the adversaries report the opposite consistent decision
to the data fusion center.
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FIGURE 2. The performance comparison of cooperative spectrum sensing system with anti SSDF
attack.
Under the L/M fusion rule, the cooperative detection prob-



















i(1− Pf )M−i, (20)
where L = ⌈(M + 1)/2⌉, and symbol ⌈z⌉ indicates the
smallest integer value greater than z. Let α = M
N
. Thus,
for each node compromised by adversaries under C-SSDF
attacks, the cooperative detection probability PD(M ,N ) and
false alarm probability PF (M ,N ), can be unified as
PD(M ,N ) = (1− α)PD,h + α(1− PD,m), (21)



















i(1− Pf )N−M−i, (24)
Q = ⌈(1− α)K⌉ . (25)
C. SECURITY MECHANISM TO RESIST SSDF
MAC, also called cryptographic checksum, is used to check
on the reported spectrum sensing information.MACproduces
a data package of n bits and sends with original data [20]. The
MAC is computed with a Hash function using the spectrum
sensing reported information as follows:
MAC = CT (S), (26)
where S is local sensing result of 1 bit, the encryption key T
is shared between legitimate SUs and FC. Each SU uses
generation function to figure the MAC of B-1 bits, and then
sends the total B bits data to FC. The FC deduces the MAC
of received message on the basis of the same function and
encryption key and then compares them with the received
MAC to formalize whether the sensing information has been
altered.
To resist a replay attack [25], we alter the generation
function as
MAC = CT (S |Seq.Number ) (27)
where the Seq.Number is expressed as the sequence number
of CSS. The value of the Seq.Number is renovated through
the FC as broadcasting the common control information, but
the malicious users are unable to learn about.
To send the SSDF attack resoundingly, the malicious users
can randomly produce MAC with an intercept probability
Px = 1/2B−1. When MAC length is increased, the SSDF
intercept probability of the malicious SU is decreased, and
thus security can be guaranteed. Hence the global secure
detection probability and global secure false alarm probabil-


















i(1− Px)M−iPF (i,N ). (29)
Define the total error probability as










i(1− Px)M−i(1− PD(i,N )). (31)
Figure 2 shows the impact of the cooperative spectrum
sensing on the cooperative false alarm probability when the
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FIGURE 3. Cooperative false alarm probability versus the number of malicious users with
anti SSDF attack.
FIGURE 4. Cooperative false alarm probability versus the encrypted information.
system is attacked by SSDF under theK /N criterion. It can be
seen that encryption can greatly reduce the cooperative false
alarm probability, i.e., the false alarm probability with MAC
decreases by 0.79 when the local false alarm probability is
0.5 for always busy independent malicious attack.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the false alarm
probability and the number of malicious users before and
after encryption under the same fusion rule (‘K /N ’). It can be
observed that the probability of false alarm increases with the
number of malicious users. Before encryption, the resulting
effect of the malicious users on the false alarm probability
is large. For example, the malicious user number increases
from 1 to 10, the probability of false alarm before encryption
increases by 0.66, but the probability of false alarm after
encryption only increases by a factor of 0.15.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the probability
of false alarm and the amount of encrypted information.
As can be seen from the figure, the probability of cooperative
false alarm decreases as the amount of encrypted information
increases. It is also observed that more malicious users lead
to higher false alarm probability.
D. ENERGY CONSUMPTION MODEL
In CRNs, when sensor nodes carry out spectrum sensing,
data transmission/reception and idle listening, they always
consume energy. In this paper we focus on studying the
energy efficiency as sensor nodes execute spectrum sensing.
The energy consumption of spectrum sensing is composed of
two parts: energy consumption in sensing the spectrum and
sensing results transmission. Since a binary local decision is
used in the spectrum sensing result, the energy consumption
of transmitting the sensing results, compared to the energy
consumption of spectrum sensing, is very small and can be
ignored [25]. The energy consumption of spectrum sens-
ing becomes crucial for the CRNs when cooperative spec-
trum sensing is adopted. According to [25], the total energy
consumption arisen from spectrum sensing can be simply
written as
E = Ecss,sec + Et , (32)
where Ecss,sec = Nes + NBer , es is the energy consumption
arisen from one SU in sensing and er is the energy consump-
tion arisen from transmitting 1-bit data to the FC, Et is the
energy consumed by transmitting.
III. ANALYSIS ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY OF SSDF
The optimization objective is the energy efficiency maxi-
mization of cooperative spectrum sensing under the security
requirements. The global secure detection probability and
global secure false alarm probability can be used to scale the
effects of attack on the performance of system. Therefore,
5670 VOLUME 6, 2018
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where P0(1 − PF,sec) is the probability that the spectrum
is detected correctly when it is not used by PU, R is the
transmission rate in bps, T is the transmission time.
By usingMAC to resist SSDF attack, we design the energy
efficiency maximization by optimizing the number of coop-
erative spectrum sensing nodesN and the number of the addi-
tional security bits. Specifically, the optimization problem is















x i(1− Pf )N−i, Pf < 1,
x ∈ (0,Pf ], N > 1. By using the binomial theorem, we have
f (x) = (x + 1− Pf )N . (35)
















qj(1− Pf )N−j. (36)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
A. RELATION BETWEEN ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND THE
NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING NODES
We assume that both the number of malicious users and the
amount of encrypted information are constants, and then µsec
is a function of variable that is the number of cooperative
spectrum sensing nodes. Note that dE
dN
= es + Ber . Denote
∂µsec
∂N
as the partial derivative of the energy efficiency taken














where P′F,sec(N ) can be derived by Lemma 1 as follows.
Case 1: Independent SSDF Attack









For notation simplicity, we define A
1= q+ 1− Pf , ξ 1=
P0RT . So we have






ln (q+ 1− Px). (39)
In this case, we can prove that the energy efficiency has





Since q < Pf , q + 1 − Px < 1. Therefore P′F,sec(N ) <
0, and the global secure false alarm probability PF,sec(N )









> 0 for any
value of N . Hence, there must exist an optimal number of
cooperative spectrum sensing nodes that can maximize the














= es + Ber
(es + Ber )− E lnA
. (40)
Then, we get











1= es + Ber
(es + Ber )− E lnA
. (43)
Obviously, both Y (N ) and (N ) are decreasing. Since
1 > A = q + 1 − Pf > 0, we have PxA > Px and lnA < 0.








(0) = es + Ber
(es + Ber )− Et lnA
< 1 , (45)
lim
N→∞
Y (N ) = 0 , (46)
lim
N→∞





= 0 . (48)
Y (N ) is an infinitesimal of higher order than (N ) as N
goes to infinity. So there must exist N0 such that Y (N ) <
 (N ) in (N0,+∞).
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that Y (N )
only intersects (N ) once. Therefore, the root of equation
∂µsec
∂N
= 0 is unique, and the energy efficiency is an unimodal
function and there exists only one optimal value of N that
maximizes µsec.Thus, Bisection method [27], [28] can be
used to obtain the optimal number of cooperative spectrum
sensing nodes.
Case 2: Collaborative SSDF Attack
Similarly using Lemma1, PF,sec(N ) can be expressed as
PF,sec(N ) = α
(







1− (q2 + 1− Pf )M) (49)
where 0 < q1, q2 < Pf . So we have
P′F,sec(N )






ln (q1 + 1− Px) .
(50)
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Analogously to the case 1, it also can be proved that the
energy efficiency is a unimodal function and there exists only
one optimal value of N that maximizes µsec in Case 2.
B. RELATION BETWEEN ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND THE
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION ENCRYPTION
Assume that both the number of malicious users and the
number of cooperative spectrum sensing nodes are constants,
µsec is a function with a variable B that is the amount of
encrypted information. Problem (34) can be rewritten as
max
B





The methodological analysis used in [29] to solve the
fractional optimization can be consulted here to solve Prob-
lem (51). First, we regulate a function as
f (B, λ) = R(B)− λP(B), (52)




f (B, λ). (53)
If g(λ) is a monotonically decreasing function in terms of
λ, the optimal solution of Problem (51) exists at g(λ) = 0
[29].
Theorem 1: g(λ) is a monotonically decreasing function
of λ.
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Theorem 2: The root of equation g(λ) = 0 is the maxi-
mum value of energy efficiency. And the optimal solution of
problem (51) uniquely exists when f (B, λ) = 0.
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
It is difficult to obtain the solution of such problem in a
closed form expression. Hence the solution can be computed
by the iterative search algorithm. With a given number of
cooperative spectrum sensing nodes, we can simply use the
following bisection algorithm (Algorithm 1) to solve Prob-
lem (51) over an interval [0,B0], which is known to contain
B∗.
Algorithm for finding the optimalB∗
1: Initialize a feasible B, B ∈ [0,B0], λmin, λmax, tolerance
ε, iteration number n = 1;
2: Repeat
a) λ← (λmin + λmax)/2
b) Find optimal B∗ maximizing f (B, λ) by bisection
algorithm;
c) If g (λ) > 0, λmax ← λ
else λmin ← λ;
3: Until λmax − λmin < ε;
4: Output B∗.
where ε is a predefined small constant to control the accuracy
of convergence.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, performance results are presented through
numerical results. All channels are modeled by the product
of path-loss and independent Rayleigh fading with complex
normal distribution CN (0, 1) [30], [31]. The path loss in deci-
bels is modeled as 38.46+35log10(d), where d is measured in
meters [6]. All simulation results are obtained by averaging
over 200 channel realizations. The main system parameters
are given in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Main simulation parameters.
The effect on the achievable energy efficiency is shown
in Figure 5 when the legitimate SUs do not employ any secu-
rity algorithm and employ MAC algorithm, respectively. The
energy efficiency is drawn versus the fusion rule threshold
K for different numbers of malicious users M . It is visible
that the energy efficiency is lowered as increasingMs. It can
be observed that the threshold K plays an important rule to
make a reduction in the effect of the malicious users. In the
case of insecure CSS, for M ≥ K , the energy efficiency is
zero since Pf is one according to (18), and hence no data
will be transmitted. But increasingK can relieve the influence
on energy efficiency. In Figure 5, MAC clearly addresses the
malicious effects on the CSS, in which the energy efficiency
achieved by the proposed secure CSS is explored versus
the fusion rule threshold K for B = 4. The curve can be
attributed to the MAC effects that are the increase in the
successfully transmitted data since MAC lowers the false
alarm probability.
Figure 6 is simulated to show the energy efficiency ver-
sus number of cooperating SUs under I-SSDF attacks, and
Figure 7 shows the energy efficiency versus number of coop-
erating SUs under C-SSDF attacks. We can conclude that it
is not always helpful to use all the available SUs in CSS.
To enhance the energy efficiency, there is a deficiency to
detect the optimal number of cooperating SUs. We can pred-
icate that increasing M lowers the achievable energy effi-
ciency since the more malicious users increase the false alarm
probability.
The energy efficiency using MAC based CSS is explored
in Figure 8 under I-SSDF attacks and in Figure 9 under
C-SSDF attacks considering the number of the reported bits
B for K = 6 and different numbers of malicious users,
respectively. It can be seen from the figures, along with
the increase of the number of the reported bits B, the effi-
ciency increases first and then decreases, that is to say,
there is the optimal reported bits B that maximizes energy
efficiency.
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FIGURE 5. The energy efficiency versus the fusion rule threshold for multiple numbers of malicious
uses.
FIGURE 6. The energy efficiency versus the number of secondary users under I-SSDF attacks.
FIGURE 7. The energy efficiency versus the number of secondary users under C-SSDF attacks.
Figure 10 compares the energy efficiency versus the num-
ber of the reported bits B for M = 4 and K = 6 under
two types of attacks. The C-SSDF attack lowers the energy
efficiency since the accuracy of the cooperative spectrum
sensing under C-SSDF attacks is lower than that under
I-SSDF attacks.
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FIGURE 8. The energy efficiency versus encryption information under I-SSDF attacks.
FIGURE 9. The energy efficiency versus encryption information under C-SSDF attacks.
FIGURE 10. The comparison of energy efficiency versus encryption information under two
types of attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the energy efficiency in the
secure cooperative spectrum sensing for CRNs and inves-
tigated the impacts of independent and collaborative SSDF
attacks on the accuracy of cooperative spectrum sensing.
To resist SSDF attack, MAC is adopted to reduce the effects
of the malicious users. The analysis and simulations show
that the number of malicious users, the number of spectrum
5674 VOLUME 6, 2018
J. Dai et al.: MAC Based Energy Efficiency in Cooperative CRN in the Presence of Malicious Users
sensing nodes and the number of the reported bits have signif-
icant impacts on the accuracy of cooperative sensing results.
Then the concept of energy efficiency is defined in terms of
the number of cooperative sensor nodes and the number of
the additional security bits as design variables. Simulation
results have showed that there exist only one optimal number
of cooperative sensor nodes and optimal value of security
bits that can maximize the energy efficiency, respectively.
Simulation results have verified the efficiency of the proposed
MAC based CSS.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: Since N > 1, f (x) is a monotonically increasing
and continuous function in (0,Pf ]. So we have





















f (1− Pf )N−j = 1. (55)
By using the intermediate value theorem, there exists q ∈



























qj(1− Pf )N−j. (57)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: For given f (B, λ) = 0 , we have
∂f (B, λ)
∂λ
= −P(B) = − (Nes + NBer + Et) < 0. (58)
Thus, f (B, λ) is a monotonically decreasing function of λ
for any B. For any positive number 1, we have




f (B, λ) ≥ f (B, λ) > f (B, λ+1), ∀B, (60)
it is derived that
g(λ) > max
B
f (B, λ+1) = g(λ+1). (61)
Therefore, g(λ) is a monotonically decreasing function
of λ.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: According to (33) and (52), for any B, we have
f (B, µsec(B)) = 0. (62)
We define Bopt as the optimal solution of (51). Since
µsec(Bopt ) is the maximum value of energy efficiency,
λ = µsec(Bopt ) is the largest value of λ that can satisfy
f (B, λ) = 0.
Then, we define λ∗ as the root of g(λ) = 0, i.e.,
g(λ∗) = 0. And B∗ is the corresponding value that maxi-
mizes f (B, λ∗) = 0. Since g(λ) is a monotonically decreas-




f (B, λ¯) < 0. (63)
Thus, any λ¯ > λ∗ is unable to satisfy f
(
B, λ¯
) = 0. Hence,
λ∗ is the largest value that can satisfy f (B, λ) = 0, and
we can get λ∗ = µsec(Bopt ) and B∗ = Bopt . Therefore,
the root λ∗ of g(λ) = 0 is the maximum value of energy
efficiency.
The second order derivative of f (B, λ) with respect to B for







Case 1: Independent SSDF Attack
According to Lemma1, PF,sec(B) can be expressed as
PF,sec(B) = AN
(






































So f (B, λ) is a concave function in terms of B, and the
optimal solution of (51) is uniquely exists.
Case 2: Collaborative SSDF Attack
Similarly using Lemma1, PF,sec(B) can be expressed as
PF,sec(B) = α
(







1− (q2 + 1− Pf )M), (67)
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where 0 < q1, q2 < Pf . For notation simplicity, we define
A1
1= q1 + 1− Pf , A2 1= q2 + 1− Pf . So we yield
∂2f (B, λ)
∂B2






























So f (B, λ) is also a concave function in terms of B, and the
optimal solution of (51) is uniquely exists.
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